Saturday, June 29, 2019

"The country’s copyright law requires a digital reboot", Oped by Vivan Sharan, Mint, April 2019

Digital music giant Spotify, which entered the Indian market earlier this year, has already opened its account in local courts. Music behemoth Warner Music, a former investor in Spotify, has sued the company over a matter that promises to send ripples through India’s intellectual property regime. Specifically, Spotify recently invoked a statutory licensing provision (Section 31-D) under India’s Copyright Act, in an attempt to gain access to content owned by Warner Music, for redistribution. Warner Music has, in turn, filed an injunction at the Bombay High Court to prevent Spotify from accessing its content through such means.
Statutory licensing serves as an exception to the exclusive economic rights of a copyright holder. This makes copyright licensing a minefield of litigation. The Spotify-Warner case will add a nebulous layer of jurisprudence to an economic area that merits more detailed legislative attention.
India’s copyright regime is ostensibly based on the premise that “knowledge must be allowed to be disseminated". This public-interest rationale stems from a much-cited 2008 Supreme Court judgement. The ruling firmly established that the use of non-voluntary licences to enhance consumer access can be availed of by private entities, as well as public entities. However, the proliferation of information and communication technologies (ICTs) has changed the knowledge-dissemination paradigm. The dominance of digital markets necessitates a relook at the existing copyright regime—which is not a job for courts.
Historically, music licensing in India has involved bundling of the underlying rights for musical composition, lyrics, performance, and even synchronization with the copyright for the sound recording. Until a seminal legislative amendment in 2012, which made such underlying rights “non-assignable", the wholesale transfer of rights to movie producers was a common practice. Such producers would then transfer these rights to record labels. This gave primary-rights owners, such as lyricists, performers and composers, no claim on future royalties. In many ways, the erstwhile regime was fit for a market where the music industry was primarily financed by the film industry, particularly Bollywood. However, the Bollywood-centricity of music markets is being disrupted by internet streaming.
Market disruptions notwithstanding, judicial intervention is never far from upending accommodative legislative reform in India. In 2016, in another court case with large economic ramifications, the pre-2012 practice of transfer of rights was re-allowed for sound recordings that are not embedded in a cinematograph film. Primary-rights owners were dealt a blow through a judicial intervention that paid insufficient attention to changing market dynamics. Independent of the legal rigmarole, India’s music industry has managed to cross the1,000-crore mark in 2018, and need not play second fiddle to films forever. Through sustained growth of internet streaming revenues, the industry can become a force to reckon with in its own right.
In fact, technology has helped several Indian industries overcome challenges stemming from static regulatory regimes. For instance, TV broadcasters in India have invested heavily in online video platforms to disseminate new content. Such investments will help them overcome a legacy of prescriptive economic regulations in the TV market. Similarly, in the case of the music industry, digital platforms will enable greater consumer reach, as well as product and service innovation, to maximize industry revenues.
To its credit, the government recognized an untapped export potential of the audio and video industries last year and gave them “Champion Sector" status. The earning prospects of audio-visual exports are linked to the growth of digital markets.
Several Indian industries, ranging from telecom to mining, have suffered the consequences of judicial overreach in economic matters. As a principle, such interventions should be curtailed to instances of discernible market failure. Moreover, digital markets are exceptional on several counts, necessitating that judicial interventions be narrow in scope. First, internet streaming does not rely on the use of scarce public spectrum, as television or radio broadcasting does. Second, the cost of switching between streaming services is negligible as it does not involve replacement of any equipment or distributors. And third, in theory, there can be no discrimination between large and small streaming businesses at the network level of the internet, thanks to network neutrality rules.
Wisely, Indian legislators have held back from expanding the scope of statutory licensing from broadcasting to internet streaming. However, the department for promotion of industry and internal trade issued an “Office Memorandum" in 2016, seemingly attempting precisely this. While the legality and impact of the memorandum remains untested, it underlines a latent impulse to carry over legacy licensing constructs into the new economy. The Warner-Spotify dispute may heighten similar impulses within the judiciary, which seldom bothers to frame interventions in the context of market forces. The 17th Lok Sabha would do well to redraft the country’s copyright law to reflect the realities of digital markets, before other arms of the government begin to redefine public interest in this issue.
These are the authors’ personal views

Vivan Sharan comments on India's proposed e-commerce policy, Forbes, February 2019

Vivan Sharan, partner at Koan Advisory, a consultancy that works with several foreign technology companies that are operating in India, says the policy does "a poor job" at understanding what drives innovation and value in the digital world.
"Innovation stems from the provision of incentives, the basic premise of the many intellectual property frameworks," he says. "If the state takes away such incentives by labeling itself the self-declared ‘trustee’ of all data generated domestically, which seems to be a central premise of the draft policy, it does no service to the growth of a digital India."

Vivan Sharan comments ion Apple's investments in India, Economic Times, Feb 2019

Industry experts believe India has huge potential as the next manufacturing hub for Apple, especially coupled with China-US geopolitical pressures. However, some believe gains will be symbiotic. “Frankly, this seems to be more of a miss for the Indian government, than the other way round,” says Vivan Sharan, partner, Koan Advisory, a public policy advisory which has Netflix and Amazon as its clients. 

Thursday, March 28, 2019

Why armed escalation is not of interest, Priyesh Mishra, The Pioneer, 4 March 2019

Original Link

https://www.dailypioneer.com/2019/columnists/why-armed-escalation-is-not-of-interest.html

Achieving intended outcomes by deploying escalation as a policy objective is dependent on external factors that are beyond effective control of parties to a conflict. Most of these factors may not exist in objective reality. This is exactly what India and Pakistan cannot afford
The chain of events following the Pulwama attack has plunged the security environment in the Indian sub-continent to its lowest point since Operation Parakram. Media-led clamour for retaliatory use of force against Pakistan has been gaining decibels ever since. And such has been the predictability of Government response in the post-truth world that limited use of military force was instantly foretold.
However, the air strikes on Jaish-e-Mohammad training camps inside Pakistani territory came as a surprise to both Pakistan as well as analysts on both sides of the border. While India termed the strikes as “non-military” and “pre-emptive”, the use of sophisticated terminology did not deter Pakistan from carrying out retaliatory airstrikes, which led to an Indian Air Force (IAF) pilot and his Mig-21 being shot down.
Amid claims and counter-claims of who inflicted how much damage, the two nuclear powers are once again on the verge of a full-fledged military conflict. What is appalling is that despite the criticality of the situation, prominent intelligentsia is suggesting that India must seek escalation. Their argument is that previous piecemeal military actions have failed to establish credible deterrence. While precedents may favour this argument, there is a fundamental flaw with the use of escalation as a deliberate policy measure — its propensity to spiral out of control.
Numerous externalities impact the deviation between intended objectives and actual outcome of an escalatory action. To begin with, what should be the escalatory threshold? The subjectivity of escalatory threshold is one of the reasons that escalation is so difficult to manage and/or successfully exploit. Escalatory threshold may be symmetric — where a threshold is viewed similarly by both parties or asymmetric — situations where a threshold may loom large for one party but may seem obscure to the other. Second is the anticipated response from an adversary. Generally, when one party to a conflict crosses the escalatory threshold, it expects the other side to follow suit. Once again, this response may be symmetric, asymmetric or sometimes even absent.
For example, during World War I, when the German Army introduced gas warfare, the Allied forces responded in equal measure, which kept the perceptive breach of escalatory threshold in balance. However, such a symmetric response may not be available if the prospect of equal retaliation seems less appealing or unavailable to the other party. For example, during Operation Desert Storm, frustrated by the sustained air strikes of the US-led forces, Iraq deliberately sought to escalate the conflict by firing ballistic missiles at Israel. The idea was to irk the coalition forces and draw them into war. However, Israel did not retaliate and coalition forces refused to be drawn into a premature full-blown war.
To sum up, achieving intended outcomes by deploying escalation as a policy objective is dependent on external factors which are beyond effective control of parties to a conflict. Most of these factors are presumptive in nature and may or may not exist in objective reality. This increases the chance of a miscalculation exponentially and that is exactly what two nuclear-armed nations cannot afford.
Even if India is certain to attain escalation dominance, it makes for little practical sense, given that stakes are higher for India as compared to Pakistan. An armed conflict at this point will have a multi-modal impact on India. The immediate casualty would be the economy. Wars are expensive. Just to add to perspective, the US federal price tag for the post 9/11 wars is pegged over $5.9 trillion till date (more than double of India’s GDP). The Indian economy is already facing headwinds from a rebound in global oil prices amidst a host of other macro-economic concerns, besides uncertainty over the upcoming general elections. While the near $3 trillion economy may stay resilient in the face of a limited armed conflict, an escalated conflict may lead to diminished foreign investment and consequent economic slowdown. India is currently jockeying, some would argue not particularly successfully, a limited time-frame during which it can leverage its demographic dividend to transition into a higher-income and productive economy.
Further, an armed conflict at this point will also derail the modernisation of the armed forces. The much-needed force modernisation has only recently started to show some form. Indian armed forces are in the process of acquiring as well as developing new platforms and structures to boost defence preparedness. Key amongst these is the restructuring of the Indian Army into a leaner force by creating integrated battle groups. Strides have also been made in creating a separate command for cyber and space warfare. These reforms are critical to the enhancement of the combat capability of the Indian forces. China, too, is undergoing similar reforms, under which its territorial Army has been downsized. An economically and militarily fragile India will not enjoy the same strategic advantages as it currently does, which puts at risk its membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the UN Security Council.
The risks of an escalation gone wrong far outweigh any perceived benefits. With the release of the captured IAF pilot, India’s option to escalate has become politically unviable. In this backdrop, non-military escalation would be the most viable strategy.
It would be in India’s utmost interest to maintain sustained multi-pronged pressure on Pakistan and ensure that it is declared an international pariah. To begin with, India must rise over the rhetoric and officially treat Pakistan as a terror-sponsoring state in its foreign policy. India’s economic heft and the recent uptick in Indo-China relations post the Wuhan summit, must also be leveraged to score a diplomatic upper hand in its initiatives to blacklist terrorist organisations breeding on Pakistani soil. Non-military punitive actions like weaponising the Indus Water Treaty must be duly considered. Above all, India must carve out a consistent Pakistan policy as the extant mixture of hard and soft approach has far outrun its course.
(The writer is legal associate and defence analyst, Koan Advisory Group)

Vivan Sharan moderates panel on "Specialisaiton vs. Scale: What work for Indian M&E?" at FICCI FRAMES, March 2019

 Specialisation vs. Scale: What works for Indian M&E?

The Indian M&E space is in the throes of transition. Production processes are becoming increasingly specialized as a result of technological changes and fragmentation of global supply chains. Simultaneously, convergence and consolidation are driving the need for creative businesses to achieve scale, to reach more consumers and remain export-competitive in global markets. The panel will debate how stakeholders in the Indian creative economy, including within civil society and government, should balance these imperatives.

Moderator
Vivan Sharan, Partner, Koan Advisory Group
Panellists
Arun Thapar, Head of Content, A+E Networks
Shohini Sengupta, Fellow, Esya Centre
Shreyas Srinivasan, Founder and CEO, Insider.in
Dinraj Shetty, Director, Digital Sales, licensing and Business Development, Sony Music Entertainment
Karan Ahluwalia, Senior President and Country Head, M&E, Fine Arts, Luxury and Sports Banking Group, Yes Bank

Coverage link:
https://bestmediainfo.com/2019/03/experts-debate-what-is-stopping-indian-creative-economy-from-growing/

Kaon Advisory's coverage of FICCI FRAMES, March 2019

Koan Advisory experts blog about various sessions held at FICCI FRAMES 2019, for the Motion Pictures Association.

The blogs can be found at this link:

https://www.creativefirst.film/articles/creative-first-s-coverage-of-ficci-frames-20


Koan Advisory's response to public consultation on amendment to Cinematograph Bill